Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Accounting
Rutgers University
2013
Anthony Anderson, Ph.D., earned his B.A. from Dartmouth College, MBA from the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University, and Ph.D. from Rutgers University. He was also an instructor at Rutgers University from 2007 to 2013. Between 1989 and 2007, he worked in the profession as a corporate bond trader for Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and Company, Millennium Securities Brokerage, and Hapoalim Securities. Dr. Anderson specializes in liquidity and capital markets, market anomalies, and market efficiency. His areas of expertise include asset valuation, fixed-income securities, accounting, and financial statement analysis.
Accounting
Rutgers University
2013
English
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management
1980
English
Dartmouth College
1979
Auditor Litigation and the Market and Legal Penalties on Client Firms
This study examines the relation between auditor litigation and the market and legal penalties imposed on sued audit clients after the private securities litigation reform act (PSLRA).
Managerial Opportunism and Real Activities Manipulation: Evidence from Option Backdating Firms
This study aims to examine the use of real activities manipulation by firms implicated in the stock option backdating scandal. The authors report unusually low R&D and unusually low SG&A expenses among the backdating firms. They also find evidence of unusually high production costs among backdating firms compared to the matched firms.
Financial Misreporting Period and Investor Reaction to Securities Litigation
This study investigates the relation between financial misreporting period and investor reaction to securities litigation announcement. A sample of 301 securities lawsuits between 1996 and 2005 is used in the regression of investor reaction around securities litigation on financial misreporting period and other variables. A negative relation is reported between financial misreporting period and the investor reaction to securities litigation announcement, which suggests that the longer the concealment period, the more the market perceives a securities fraud lawsuit as being meritorious. Our findings imply that the market losses associated with securities litigation can be mitigated if the misstating firms release negative earnings-related news in a timely manner. The results of this study contribute to our understanding of the investor reaction to securities litigation and also provide support for regulation that enhances the timeliness of material event disclosures.